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WAYNE'S PEACE WITH THE INDIANS OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1795

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

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Ohio Indian Lands Ceded to the United States By the Treaty of Greene Ville, 1795



The Greene Ville cession of lands in the Old Northwest included all the area in the present state of Ohio south and east of the treaty line running from Lake Erie to the Ohio River. The Indian Lands in Ohio were further reduced by seven other tracts: (1) at Fort Loramie (present Fort Loramie); (2) near Girty's town (present St. Marys); (3) at the head of navigable water of the Auglaize River (about 9 miles northwest of present Wapakoneta); (4) at Fort Defiance (present Defiance); (5) at the British Fort Miamis (present Maumee); (6) at the mouth of the Maumee River (present Toledo); and (7) at the lower rapids of the Sandusky River (present Fremont).

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WAYNE'S PEACE WITH THE INDIANS OF THE OLD NORTHWEST, 1795*

by Dwight L. Smith
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Far from being the least of the many problems with which the United States had to contend at its beginning was the settling of difficulties between the Indians and whites on the frontier. If the new nation were to grow in size, as apparently it was doing, the native Indians would have to be removed, absorbed, or extirpated, either voluntarily or by force. The decade from 1783 to 1793 was one in which neither voluntary nor forcible means brought a solution. Peace emissaries and military expeditions alike suffered defeat, and the Indians became more and more restless and unsettled. Only after a carefully planned and executed campaign by General "Mad Anthony" Wayne were the Indians faced with no other alternative but to make peace. This was accomplished by the Treaty of Greene Ville, August 3, 1795.

When the American Revolution was officially ended with the exchange of treaty ratifications by the United States and Great Britain on May 12, 1784, the Indians had neither been consulted about the treaty nor mentioned in it.[1] The war was only suspended in the interior by the peace between the United States and Great Britain. A supplementary peace was necessary, therefore, to liquidate the war in the West. Congress attempted to effect a general settlement, and referred the problem of conciliating the

* This is the text of a paper given at the forty-third annual meeting of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association, Oklahoma City, April 20-22, 1950.

[1] A British officer described the great disgust which prevailed among the Indians when they learned of the proposed treaty and its boundaries. Allen Maclean to Frederick Haldimand (abstract), May 18, 1783, in "Calendar of Haldimand Collection," *Report on Canadian Archives* (37 vols., Ottawa, 1882-1929), 1886, pp. 32-33. The Calendar of the Haldimand Collection is in three volumes scattered through the *Reports* for the years 1884 through 1889. The abstract of the letter referred to above is in Volume II, which, with its own pagination, begins at the end of the *Report* for 1886.

Indians to a special committee for study. The committee proposed a general boundary line to follow the course of the Great Miami River in Ohio from its mouth to the mouth of the Mad River in present Dayton, thence northward to the Maumee River, and down that river to Lake Erie.[2] George Washington suggested much the same boundary plus the inclusion of the settlement at Detroit.[3] The report of a subsequent committee, under Thomas Jefferson's chairmanship, advocated a westward shift of the proposed boundary, with the meridian line "passing through the lowest point of the rapids of the Ohio" and extending to the northern boundary of the United States. Realizing that congress lacked the means of raising an overwhelming force needed to impose the general settlement envisioned by the previous committee, it was now advocated that separate negotiations and separate treaties be made with the several tribes "at different times and places."[4]

Actually the hardy frontiersmen were given free reign to invade the Indian country. They gave no heed to the unenforceable orders of congress against the private purchase and occupation of Indian lands. Piecemeal treaties were negotiated in hopes that the combined efforts would at least roughly approximate a settlement of the problem.[5] Peace became more, rather than less, tenuous as the Indians observed that the treaties were not adhered to by the whites. Sporadically, raids and depredations continued and increased on the frontier. The problem was not being solved. To survive, the frontiersman had to be as adept with his gun as he was efficient with his ax. Nor was the Indian alone responsible. Henry Knox asserted that "the injuries and murders have been so reciprocal, that it would be a point of critical investigation to know on which side they have been the greatest." He urged upon

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[2] The full committee report of October 15, 1783, is given in Worthington C. Ford and others, eds., *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789* (34 vols., Washington, 1904-37), XXV, 680-688.

[3] Washington to James Duane, September 7, 1783, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington* (39 vols., Washington, 1931-44), XXVII, 133-140.

[4] The full committee report of March 19, 1784, is given in Ford, *Journals of the Continental Congress*, XXVI, 152-155.

[5] Treaties of Fort Stanwix, October 22, 1784; Fort McIntosh, January 21, 1785; Fort Finney, January 31, 1786; and Fort Harmar (two treaties), January 9, 1789.

Washington the definite need for something to be done and predicted that "unless some dicisive [*sic*] measures are immediately adopted to terminate those mutual hostilities, they will probably become general among all the Indians northwest of the Ohio." [6]

As early as July 1789 the president began to collect from all possible sources information relative to the situation so that he might be able to form a just opinion and reach some definite decisions.[7] Three months later he issued instructions to Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, to ascertain whether the Indians were more inclined to war or peace. If the latter, then steps should be taken to secure it at once. If not peace, and hostilities should continue against the frontiers, then "you are hereby authorized and empowered . . . to call . . . for such detachments of militia [from Pennsylvania and Virginia] as you may judge proper." Washington thereby committed himself to whatever decision St. Clair should make. Knox tempered these instructions by pointing out to St. Clair that a general treaty made with the Indians was greatly to be desired and that he should bend every effort towards that end.[8]

Inasmuch as the government was not yet ready or prepared to chastise the "renegades," St. Clair was quite willing to attempt a peaceful solution. He was dubious, nevertheless, as to whether this might be obtained at all without the display and possibly the use of force.[9]

In April 1790 St. Clair dispatched Antoine Gamelin, Indian agent, trader, and notary public at Vincennes, to the tribes and villages of the Wabash River and to the Miami nations residing on the Maumee River. He carried a message which indicated that the United States desired to establish a general peace with

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[6] Knox to Washington, June 15, 1789, in *American State Papers* (38 vols., Washington, 1832-61), *Indian Affairs*, I, 12-14.

[7] Tobias Lear to William Jackson, July 22, 1789, in Clarence E. Carter, comp. and ed., *The Territorial Papers of the United States* (14 vols., Washington, 1934-), II, *The Territory Northwest of the River Ohio, 1787-1803*, 199.

[8] Washington to St. Clair, October 6, 1789, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 96-97; Knox to St. Clair, December 19, 1789, in Carter, *Territorial Papers, The Territory Northwest of the River Ohio*, II, 224-226.

[9] St. Clair to Knox, January 26, 1790, in William H. Smith, ed., *The St. Clair Papers* (2 vols., Cincinnati, 1882), II, 132-133.

all the neighboring Indians, but which at the same time firmly stated that they must abstain from further depredations. Gamelin returned from his mission without having succeeded in making peace. Upon receipt of this news, St. Clair decided to carry out offensive operations against the Indians. In this he received the concurrence of Knox, who felt there was no other alternative but "to extirpate, utterly, if possible, the said banditti." [10]

A punitive expedition was prepared for early fall by which the United States was to demonstrate its power by destroying the crops and villages of the Indians with a sudden stroke. General Josiah Harmar's army of militia and regulars marched in mid-October to the principal Indian towns on the Maumee River only to find them deserted. Supplies, corn fields, and five Miami villages were destroyed. In two encounters with the Indians under the leadership of the Miami chief Little Turtle, however, the Americans were routed and driven back in disorder.[11] Encouraged by this, which they interpreted from their standpoint as being a complete failure for Harmar, the Indians became bolder. On January 2, 1791, a band of Shawnee massacred about half the inhabitants of the Big Bottom settlement, about forty miles up the Muskingum River from Marietta in Ohio. Rufus Putnam declared that "the Indians were much elated with their success & threatened there should not remain a Smoak on the ohio by the time the Leaves put out." [12]

A congressional appropriation and provision for an additional force of men indicated official reaction to the Harmar defeat and the Big Bottom massacre. To do what Harmar had failed

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[10] For the journal of Gamelin's mission, April 5 to May 5, 1790, see *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 93-94; St. Clair to Knox, August 23, 1790, *ibid.*, I, 92-93; circular letter, St. Clair to county lieutenants, July 15, 1790, *ibid.*, I, 94-95; Knox to Harmar, June 7, 1790, and August 24, 1790, *ibid.*, I, 97-98, 99.

[11] Harmar to Matthew Ernest, commanding at Fort Pitt, August 13, 1790, in [William H. Denny, ed.], *Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny* (Philadelphia, 1859), 254-255. A day by day description of the expedition is given *ibid.*, 140-149. Denny was Harmar's aide. See also Knox to St. Clair, September 14, 1790, in Smith, *St. Clair Papers*, II, 181-183. Harmar's journal, Captain John Armstrong's journal, and other accounts are reproduced in Basil Meek, "General Harmar's Expedition," *Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, XX (1911), 74-108.

[12] Rowena Buell, comp. and ed., *The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam and Certain Official Papers and Correspondence* (Boston and New York, 1903), 112, 113.

to do became the task assigned to St. Clair.[13] As a final attempt at peace, congress commissioned Colonel Thomas Proctor to the Wabash and Maumee regions. Cornplanter and some of his fellow Seneca tribesmen, who were convinced that the United States wanted only peace, were also engaged "to undertake to impress the hostile Indians with the consequences of their persisting in hostilities, and also of the justice and moderation of the United States." Proctor's mission came to naught, because the Indians refused to have anything to do with the peace plans. A letter from St. Clair to the Iroquois, which urged them to take up arms against the western tribes, on the one hand and Proctor's mission on the other, merely led to confusion and unbelief in their minds.[14]

As a preliminary action, St. Clair sent General Charles Scott on an expedition against the Wea on the Wabash River. This and a second expedition to the same region under General James Wilkinson accomplished little but the burning of some deserted villages and corn fields and the taking of a few prisoners. They did make the Indians more unitedly determined against the encroachments on their rights and lands. Peace had not been brought to the frontier.[15] The projected expedition under St. Clair would accomplish the desired end, so it was hoped. Jefferson epitomized this feeling when he said, "I hope we shall give the Indians a thorough drubbing this summer." [16] At sunrise on November 4, 1791, a "drubbing" was given, not by the whites, but by the Indians to St. Clair's army. They inflicted a slaughter and defeat that has often been compared to General Edward Braddock's defeat of 1755.[17]

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[13] *Ibid.*, 112-113; "An Act for Raising and Adding Another Regiment to the Military Establishment of the United States, and for Making Further Provisions for the Protection of the Frontiers," March 3, 1791, *U. S. Statutes at Large*, I, 222-224.

[14] Proctor's journal, March 11 to May 21, 1791, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 149-165; speeches between Washington and Cornplanter, December 1790, *ibid.*, 145-146.

[15] Knox to Scott, March 9, 1791, *ibid.*, I, 129-130; Scott to Knox, June 28, 1791, *ibid.*, I, 131-133; St. Clair to Wilkinson, July 31, 1791, *ibid.*, II, 227-229; Wilkinson to St. Clair, August 24, 1791, *ibid.*, I, 133-135.

[16] Jefferson to Washington, April 17, 1791, in Paul L. Ford, ed., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (10 vols., New York, 1892-99), V, 320-322.

[17] See "Winthrop Sargent's Diary While with General Arthur St. Clair's Expedition Against the Indians," *Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*,

The two years following St. Clair's defeat, 1792-94, were years of negotiations from which peace failed to materialize. Several attempts were made, with some of the American agents being murdered and some being turned away. One emissary, Rufus Putnam, succeeded in negotiating a treaty of peace and friendship with the Wabash and Illinois tribes. The senate refused to give its ratification to the document, however, because there was lacking in it a statement that would recognize the exclusive right of the United States to the preemption of the Indian lands.[18] Much more so than any of the previous efforts, a projected general council of the Indians for the summer of 1793, to which the United States had been invited, promised success. Benjamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy Pickering were appointed commissioners, and careful plans and instructions were made to insure the desired outcome. An understanding was not reached, because the Indians demanded the Ohio River as their southern boundary as the *sine qua non* of any treaty of peace.[19]

In the meantime the Americans were well aware of the situation and were amply preparing so that another defeat such as St. Clair's in 1791 would not occur again. Immediately upon the breakdown of the negotiations of 1793 the three commissioners notified commanding and responsible officers on the frontier that "the Indians have refused to make peace." Anthony Wayne, who had succeeded St. Clair to the military command, was warned that "a defeat at the present time, and under present circumstances, would be *pernicious in the highest degree* to the interests of our country." Since the autumn months of 1792, Wayne had been

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XXXIII (1924), 237-273; Denny, *Military Journal;* "Captain Newman's Original Journal of St. Clair's Campaign," *Wisconsin Magazine of History,* II (1918), 44-73; Frazer E. Wilson, ed., *Journal of Capt. Daniel Bradley, An Epic of the Ohio Frontier* (Greenville, Ohio, 1935), 9-34.

[18] Treaty of September 27, 1792, in Buell, *Memoirs of Rufus Putnam,* 363-366; Knox to Putnam, February 11, 1793, *ibid.,* 377; *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America,* 1-20 cong. (3 vols., Washington, 1828), I, 128, 134-135, 144-146.

[19] Knox to Lincoln, Randolph, and Pickering, April 26, 1793, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs,* I, 340-342; journal of Lincoln, Randolph, and Pickering, *ibid.,* I, 342-360.

organizing and drilling his forces in adequate preparation for a decisive victory over the Indians.[20]

The impetuousness and impatience of the Indians led them to attempt a decisive action before they were properly mobilized and organized for action. On the morning of June 30, 1794, a large force of about two thousand Indians attacked a train of packhorses that on the day before had delivered flour to Fort Recovery from headquarters at Camp Greene Ville. This was followed by "a general assault" on the fort itself. Lack of morale, organization, and proper leadership brought about a partial disintegration of the Indian forces. "I must observe with grief," wrote a British officer in his diary, "that the Indians had never [had] it in their power to do more—and have done so little." [21]

The Indians gradually reassembled, after judicious encouragement from the British, in anticipation of what they believed would mean the defeat of Wayne. As late as mid-August, Wayne was still willing to negotiate with the Indians and sent a message inviting them to meet with him. "This last overture of Peace" was rejected and Wayne marched forward once more.[22] On the morning of August 20, 1794, the American forces met the Indians in a field of fallen timber, apparently selected by the latter because of the cover it afforded them and because of the proximity of the British Fort Miamis, from which they received more than moral support. As the tide of battle turned against them, however, the Indians discovered a miscalculation in their hopes. The fort was not to be permitted to them as a haven of refuge. In

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[20] Lincoln, Randolph, and Pickering to Knox, August 21, 1793, *ibid.*, I, 359-360; letters to frontier officers, *ibid.*, I, 357-359; Knox to Wayne, September 3, 1793, in [Isaac Wayne], "Biography of General Wayne," *The Casket*, V (1830), 113; Wilson, *Journal of Capt. Daniel Bradley*, 51ff. *The Casket* is one of the titles of the publication better known as *Graham's Magazine.*

[21] Wayne to Knox, July 7, 1794, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 487-488; "Diary of an Officer in the Indian Country," June 14 to July 2, 1794, in Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., *The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves Simcoe* (5 vols., Toronto, 1923-31), V, 90-94.

[22] Alexander McKee to Governor Simcoe, July 26, 1794, in Cruikshank, *Simcoe Correspondence*, II, 344-345; Wayne to the Indians, August 13, 1794, *ibid.*, II, 371-372. See also *ibid.*, II, 373-374, 379-380.

about two hours Wayne had crushed and routed the enemy to such an extent that they were completely demoralized.[23]

Wayne exercised great restraint as he approached the British Fort Miamis, for he had authority to take it if he chose. "If . . . in the course of your operations against the Indian enemy, it should become necessary to dislodge the party at the rapids of the Miami," wrote Knox in April 1794, "you are hereby authorized, in the name of the President of the United States, to do it." Major William Campbell, the British commander, and Wayne resorted to an exchange of notes, which, though couched in the strongest terms, failed to produce any dire results.[24] After destroying all the surrounding fields and villages of the Indians, and posts and property of British traders, the American forces marched back to Fort Defiance at the mouth of the Auglaize River, cutting a wide path of destruction on either side of the Maumee River while en route.[25] Before moving farther, Wayne renewed his offer to negotiate a peace, but with no results.[26] He then moved up the Maumee River to the junction of the St. Joseph and St. Marys rivers, where he erected Fort Wayne. Late in October he returned to Greene Ville and prepared it for his winter quarters.[27]

For a while after Fallen Timbers there was some reason to believe that the Indians might collect their wits sufficiently to confront Wayne with a more formidable opposition than they had offered him on August 20. John Graves Simcoe, lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, called them together in council at Brownstown, a Wyandot village at the mouth of the Huron River in Michigan, hoping to recoup the British losses in prestige with the Indians and to regain their support. The closed gates of Fort Miamis had done something which Simcoe could not undo. The

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[23] "Daily Journal of Wayne's Campaign, from July 28th to November 2d, 1794, Including an Account of the Memorable Battle of 20th August," *American Pioneer*, I (1842), 315-322, 351-357.

[24] Knox to Wayne, [April] 1794, in Wayne, *loc. cit.*, 115; notes exchanged between Wayne and Campbell, in Cruikshank, *Simcoe Correspondence*, II, 405-408.

[25] Wayne to Knox, August 28, 1794, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 491.

[26] Wayne to the Indians, September 12, 1794, in Cruikshank, *Simcoe Correspondence*, III, 79-80.

[27] Wilson, *Journal of Capt. Daniel Bradley*.

Indians were "very low spirited and disheartened" and began to feel that what looked to them as the inevitable loss of their land was due to the interference of the British.[28] This discontent was to be of value to Wayne in his establishment of a peace with them.

Wayne was now in the position to effect what his predecessors had failed to accomplish. Assuredly his superiority of force would permit him to dictate any terms he liked, but such terms would be honored only so long as this superiority was present in the Indian country. Nine months elapsed, however, from the initial request for peace by the Indians before the signing of the treaty. The Indians acquiesced only after they were fully satisfied in their minds with the stipulations and provisions of the agreement.

As early as November 3, 1794, the Indians began to make known their desires that a peace be effected. On that day a Wyandot delegation told Wayne: "We . . . now wish for peace, and are determined to bury the hatchet and scalping knife deep in the ground." Wayne complimented them on their peace overtures and proposed the Treaty of Fort Harmar of 1789 "as a preliminary or foundation, upon which a permanent and lasting peace shall be established." [29] The efforts of Simcoe and other British officials perturbed him. That they were preventing most of the Indians from coming to him, he was certain. That the Indians were exercising duplicity between Simcoe and himself, he believed. By mid-December, however, Wayne reported to the secretary of war that he had "succeeded in dividing and distracting the counsels of the hostile Indians," so that he hoped "eventually to [be able to] bring about a general peace, or to compel the re-

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[28] William Chew to Joseph Chew (extract), October 24, 1794, in "Canadian Archives, Indian Affairs," Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, *Historical Collections*, XX (1892), 380; Joseph Brant to Joseph Chew (extract), October 22, 1794, *ibid.*, XX, 379-380; council proceedings, in "Canadian Archives, Colonial Office Records," *ibid.*, XXV (1896), 40-46.

[29] Speech of a Wyandot chief to Wayne, November 3, 1794, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 527; speech of Wayne to the Wyandot, November 4, 1794, *ibid.*, I, 528; Wayne to ———, November 5, 1794, *ibid.*, I, 549.

fractory to pass the Mississippi, and to the northwest side of the lakes." [30]

During the winter months, Indian deputations continued to appear at Greene Ville bearing "white flags" and willing to bury their tomahawks and to make peace.[31] These Indian movements were viewed with misgivings by the British. "By reports from all Quarters," wrote the commanding officer at Detroit, "I am apprehensive that the Indians have serious intentions of making peace . . . with the United States." [32]

Indeed, in the first two months of 1795 the American commander and the chiefs of the various tribes entered into preliminary articles calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a mutual restoration of prisoners. Most important, however, was the fact that June 15 of the same year was set as a date for the beginning of a conference for the purpose of drawing up a peace treaty.[33] Soon after this welcome news reached Philadelphia, the secretary of war instructed St. Clair to relax the American vigilance and defense on the frontier by dispensing with most of the militia. In the meantime, more Indians continued to make their way to Greene Ville to let it be known that they too were in favor of an established peace.[34]

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[30] Intelligence report to Wayne, November 10, 1794, *ibid.*, I, 529; Wayne to Knox, November 12, 1794, *ibid.*, I, 526-527; Wayne to Knox (extract), December 23, 1794, *ibid.*, 547-548.

[31] Entries for November 5 and December, 1794, in *Journal, Thomas Taylor Underwood, March 26, 1792 to March 18, 1800, An Old Soldier in Wayne's Army* (Cincinnati, 1945), 20; Colonel John F. Hamtramck, commanding, to Wayne, Fort Wayne, December 29, 1794, in John W. Van Cleve, "Letters of Colonel Hamtramck," *American Pioneer*, II (1843), 389; speech sent by Wayne to Indians of the Sandusky region, January 1, 1795, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 560; McKee to England, January 27, 1795, in Cruikshank, *Simcoe Correspondence*, III, 276.

[32] Richard England to McKee, January 30, 1795, in Cruikshank, *Simcoe Correspondence*, III, 279-280.

[33] Preliminary articles of a treaty of peace, Wayne with the Delaware, Miami, and Shawnee, February 11, 1795, in "Canadian Archives, Indian Affairs," Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society, *Historical Collections*, XX, 393-394; preliminary articles with the Chippewa, Miami, Potawatomi, and Sauk, no date, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 559-560; entry for January 10, 1795, in *Underwood Journal*, 20; Timothy Pickering to Bartholomew Dandridge, February 28, 1795, in Carter, *Territorial Papers, The Territory Northwest of the River Ohio*, II, 507.

[34] Pickering to St. Clair, March 25, 1795, in Smith, *St. Clair Papers*, II, 338-339; St. Clair to Colonel Sproat, April 21, 1795, *ibid.*, II, 340; Wayne's proclamation of February 22, 1795, *ibid.*, II, 343-344, note; Hamtramck to Wayne (extract), March

It would seem as though the peoples of the frontier would have been grateful for the success of Fallen Timbers and would have been most ready to do their part to assure a peaceful settlement with the Indians. It was, however, the painful task of Knox to report to the president that "the desires of too many frontier white people, to seize, by force or fraud, upon the neighboring Indian lands, has been and still continues to be, an unceasing cause of jealousy and hatred on the part of the Indians." He was apprehensive as to the probability of quieting the Indians until the frontiersmen would cease their conduct. "The encroachment of white people," he continued, "is incessantly watched . . . by the Indians." As late as a few days before the scheduled council opening, Wayne complained to St. Clair of "certain evildisposed people in the State of Kentucky [who] are determined to prevent an amicable treaty from taking place." Unless effective measures were adopted to prevent "predatory parties" from crossing the Ohio River from Kentucky, not only would lives and property in the Northwest Territory be in danger, but, he feared, peace "will not only be retarded, but eventually frustrated." [35]

As early as April 1794 Knox had sent instructions to Wayne regarding a treaty to be made with the Indians when the occasion permitted. For those tribes not parties to the Treaty of Fort Harmar, the Treaty of Fort McIntosh (1785) or the Treaty of Fort Finney (1786) would form the basis. It was highly important at the outset that Wayne "ascertain . . . what tribes are the allowed proprietors of the Country" between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes. The conditions set forth in these instructions were essentially the same as those embodied in the subsequent treaty.[36]

Timothy Pickering, who had succeeded Knox as secretary of

5, 1795, in Charles E. Slocum, *The Ohio Country Between the Years 1783 and 1815* (New York, 1910), 135-136; Hamtramck to Wayne, June 17, 1795, in Van Cleve, *loc. cit.*, 392.

[35] Report respecting United States frontiers, Knox to Washington, December 29, 1794, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 543-544; Wayne to St. Clair, June 5, 1795, in Smith, *St. Clair Papers*, II, 374-375.

[36] Knox to Wayne, April 4, 1794, in the Northwest Territory Collection in the William Henry Smith Memorial Library of the Indiana Historical Society, Indianapolis, Indiana.

war, issued instructions to Wayne in April 1795. These, with few exceptions, were substantially the same as those of Knox. Pickering directed that, in addition to the main cession, pieces of land for military posts be obtained "which you may judge necessary to have established to preserve or complete a chain of communications" over the length of the Great Miami, Wabash, and Maumee rivers. It would also be desirable to obtain lands on which trading posts were located or on which they could advantageously be established.[37] In these instructions and in the draft of a treaty that he had drawn up, Pickering also proposed a boundary line, a line from which there was some deviation in the final treaty. From a fork of a tributary of the Great Miami River near the site of Loramie's store, the line was to run down that stream to the Great Miami River, and thence down that river to the Ohio River.[38]

On June 16, 1795, the Delaware, Eel River, Ottawa, and Potawatomi tribes, who had arrived at Greene Ville within the fortnight, met with Wayne. The council fire was kindled and the calumet or ceremonial peace pipe was leisurely smoked. After a speech of welcome by the American commander and an appropriate response by one of the Indian chiefs, wampum, presents, and drink were "judiciously" distributed. As other delegations and tribes arrived, a similar pattern of welcome was carried out. It was important to the business at hand that the Indians be made to feel welcome and at ease. Camp rules and procedures were explained so they would not become alarmed at such military procedure as reveille, retreat, the fourth of July celebration, and various types of formations.[39]

In the guise of a sermon, on July 5, the Rev. Morgan J. Rhees,

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[37] Pickering to Wayne, April 8 and 14, 1795, in Northwest Territory Collection.

[38] *Ibid.;* draft of the proposed treaty in Northwest Territory Collection; Pickering to Dandridge (abstract), April 13, 1795, in *Historical Index to the Pickering Papers* (Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections,* 6th Ser., VIII, Boston, 1896), 111.

[39] Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville, June 16 to August 10, 1795, by H. DeButts, secretary, September 20, 1795, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs,* I, 564-583. See entries for June 16, 17, 21, 23, 25, 26, July 3, 4, and 13, 1795. Delegations continued to arrive even after the treaty had been voted upon on July 30. See entries for July 31 and August 3, 1795.

the army chaplain, gave Wayne and his men some sound advice. His text was taken from the Book of Judges. Gideon, "a Noble Example for all Generals and Commanders of armies," had not the "devastation and plunder" of his enemies as his object, but rather the defense of the lives, liberty, and property of his brethren. When this was accomplished, he sheathed his sword. Rhees displayed more than a common knowledge of the workings of practical diplomacy. "In order to establish a durable peace," he exhorted, "some sacrifices must be made on both sides." Here was something for Wayne to think about. One further stipulation was made by the minister which undoubtedly would have changed not only the present negotiations, but also the negotiations of most of the treaties subsequently made with the Indians. "Dissimulation and intrigue, with every species of deceptive speculation and fraudulent practice, ought to be sacrificed on the altars of strict honor and inflexible justice." [40]

After a delay of several days, to await the arrival of some groups known to be on their way to the treaty council at Greene Ville, it was decided to postpone negotiations no longer. On July 15, Wayne, in a speech to the assembled council, told the Indians that the Treaty of Fort Harmar was to be the basis of the negotiations. For the next week the Indians accomplished little except to carry on rather futile discussions and to tender unacceptable excuses for the invalidity of that treaty.[41]

The upper hand in negotiations was gained by Wayne on July 24. In his carefully prepared and delivered speech before the council, he reviewed the treaty of peace of 1783 by which the British had surrendered the territory south of the Great Lakes to the United States. Then he read the first two articles of Jay's Treaty, signed on November 19, 1794, calling for peace and friendship between the two countries and for an evacuation of all the British troops and garrisons within the boundaries of the

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[40] Morgan J. Rhees, *The Altar of Peace, Being a Substance of a Discourse Delivered in the Council House, at Greenville, July 5, 1795* (Philadelphia, 1798), 5, 9.

[41] Entries for July 9, 15, 18, 20, 21, and 22, 1795, in Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 566, 567-568, 569-571.

Northwest Territory before June 1, 1796.[42] Whatever had been the actual or potential aid of the British in the Northwest, it was now greatly diminished. Wayne further refuted arguments the Indians had presented of their ignorance of the Fort Harmar treaty. Negotiations entered a new phase, that of consideration of the tentative provisions of the treaty. "I will order you a double allowance of drink; because," Wayne asserted, "we have now buried the hatchet, and performed every necessary ceremony, to render propitious our renovated friendship." [43]

After less than a week of reading, explaining, and discussing the proposed articles, they were voted upon and accepted unanimously. It is well to note, however, the statement made by one of the Potawatomi chiefs in council. "You know we have all buried the hatchet, together with our bad actions," he declared. "You may depend on our sincerity. We cannot but be sincere, as your forts will be planted thick among us." [44]

Aside from some discussion of the cession of areas for posts and garrisons, the only important question of boundary was that involving the line from Fort Recovery to a point on the Ohio River opposite the mouth of the Kentucky River. Little Turtle, the chief spokesman, suggested that the road from Fort Recovery to Fort Hamilton and the Great Miami River be used as the boundary. He was convinced by Wayne, however, that because of the indefiniteness of the road, this line would "certainly be productive of unpleasant mistakes and differences." [45]

Objection was also made respecting the tract at the Wabash terminal of the portage connecting the Maumee and Wabash rivers. The Miami were afraid they would lose the rather profitable income derived from the traffic over this portage. "Let us both

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[42] Treaty of peace of 1783, in Hunter Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America* (7 vols., Washington, 1931-), II, 151-157, especially Article 2; Jay's Treaty, *ibid.*, II, 245-274, especially Articles 1 and 2.

[43] Entry for July 24, 1795, in Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 573-574.

[44] Entries for July 27, 28, and 30, 1795, *ibid.*, I, 574-578; draft of Pickering's proposed treaty, in Northwest Territory Collection.

[45] Entries for July 29 and 30, 1795, in Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 575-578.

own this place," it was suggested by Little Turtle, "and enjoy in common the advantages it affords." This was countered by Wayne, who pointed out to them that the traders merely added the Miami toll and carrying charges to the prices the Indians paid them for their goods. He told them that the United States was its own carrier and that the annuity allocated to the Miami would repay them many times for any losses they might sustain from losing the tract.[46]

The Treaty of Greene Ville, between the tribes of the Old Northwest and the United States, was signed on August 3, 1795.[47] Its significance to most of the 1,130 Indians present was epitomized in the remarks made by a Wyandot chief before the assembled council. Heretofore, the "Fifteen Fires" had been addressed as "Brother," but, he said, "we do now, and will henceforth, acknowledge the fifteen United States . . . to be our father . . . [we] must call them brothers no more." Equal to the occasion, Wayne replied, "I now adopt you all, in the name of the President and Fifteen great Fires of America, as their children, and you are so accordingly." [48]

By the "Peace of Mad Anthony," as it is sometimes called, the Indians surrendered the northeastern part and the southern half of Ohio. In this respect the treaty did not accomplish the

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[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Entry for August 3, 1795, *ibid.*, I, 579; Treaty of Greene Ville, August 3, 1795, manuscript (photostat), in the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society Library, Columbus; Wayne to Pickering (extract), August 9, 1795, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 564.

The tribes that signed the treaty were the Chippewa, Delaware, Eel River, Kaskaskia, Kickapoo, Miami, Ottawa, Piankashaw, Potawatomi, Shawnee, Wea, and Wyandot.

[48] Enumeration of the tribes and numbers of Indians present at the negotiations, August 7, 1795, in *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, I, 582; entry for August 7, 1795, in Minutes of the Treaty of Greene Ville, *ibid*, I, 579-580. See also a speech by Joseph Brant, a half-breed Indian leader present at the signing, made in later life, in William L. Stone, *Life of Joseph Brant-Thayendanegea* (2 vols., Cooperstown, 1844), II, 395. See also England to Simcoe, Detroit, August 20, 1795, in Cruikshank, *Simcoe Correspondence*, IV, 71-72. This letter gives an opposite picture of the negotiations. Just how much credence can be placed in it is impossible to determine. Quite probably, however, it contains an element of truth.

Trading interests present at the negotiations in one role or another, were not successful in having the treaty altered to their private benefits. This factor led to unfavorable reports. For example, see John Askin to John Askin, Jr., July 5, 1795, in Mary A. Burton, ed., *Manuscripts from the Burton Historical Collection* (Detroit, 1918), 31-32; and John Askin, Jr., to England, August 19, 1795, *ibid.*, 34-37.

goals set by the two committees of the congress a little over a decade before. One had asked for all but a narrow strip of western Ohio, while the other had called for all of Ohio and approximately the eastern half of Indiana and Michigan as well.[49]

Beyond the committee recommendations, however, much more was accomplished in a more important respect. In addition to the general cession of land, sixteen tracts comprising all the principal portages, heads of navigable streams, and trading posts were ceded, embracing, among others, the sites of present-day Loramie, Defiance, Fremont, and Toledo in Ohio, Fort Wayne in Indiana, Detroit in Michigan, and Peoria and Chicago in Illinois.[50] Besides, the people of the United States were to be permitted freedom of passage through the Indian country along the principal rivers and their connecting portages and over the road from Sandusky to Detroit via Fort Miamis. Also, the use of mouths of rivers and of harbors along lakes adjoining Indian lands was granted the Americans for purposes of shelter and safety.[51]

The United States relinquished claims to all other Indian lands north and west of the Ohio River with four important exceptions: Clark's Grant of 150,000 acres near the rapids of the Ohio River; Vincennes and adjacent lands to which the Indian title had previously been surrendered; all other lands "in possession of the French people & other white Settlers Among them, of which the Indian title has been extinguished"; and Fort Massac on the Ohio River in Illinois, not far from a point opposite the mouth of the Tennessee River.[52]

The United States was now virtually in control of the entire Old Northwest. The Treaty of Greene Ville liquidated the war

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[49] Article 3, Treaty of Greene Ville, manuscript; Homer C. Hockett, The Extinction of the Indian Title in Ohio Beyond the Greeneville Line (unpublished manuscript loaned by the author). This boundary line is shown in Charles C. Royce, comp., *Indian Land Cessions in the United States* (Bureau of American Ethnology, *Eighteenth Annual Report*, Part 2, Washington, 1899), plates CXXVI and CLVI.

[50] Article 3, Treaty of Greene Ville, manuscript. The approximate locations of these cessions are shown in Royce, *Indian Land Cessions*, plates CXXIV-CXXVII, CXXXVI, CXXXVIII, CLVI-CLVII.

[51] Article 3, Treaty of Greene Ville, manuscript.

[52] Article 4, *ibid.* These exceptions, other than the third which was never more specifically defined, are shown in Royce, *Indian Land Cessions*, plates CXXIV and CXXVI.

and accomplished the peace between the Indians and the United States. These matters had been omitted in the 1783 settlement of the United States and Great Britain, and only after a dozen years of almost chronic failure was the new nation able to assert itself and to deal with the Indians in an adequate manner.

The Treaty of Greene Ville disintegrated Indian unity, opened most of Ohio for settlement, and became the first of a series of cessions that extinguished the Indian title to the greater part of the Northwest Territory. This was indeed necessary to bring about any satisfactory settlement of the land question between the native inhabitants and the Americans who were literally beginning to crowd them out. The American government could now safely survey and open much new territory for settlement by its pioneers and at the same time make substantial advances by additional treaties. The United States had the upper hand by virtue of superiority of military force, demonstrated at Fallen Timbers, and of written commitments in the Greene Ville document. Though not unopposed, it continued to hold its dominant position until the Indian had been replaced by the white man throughout the Northwest Territory.

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